

Information & Communication Security (SS 2024)

Introduction

Prof. Dr. Kai Rannenberg,

Sascha Löbner

Chair of Mobile Business & Multilateral Security
Goethe University Frankfurt

- The Chair of M-Business and Multilateral Security
- Teaching & Research Agenda
- Organizational Issues
- Introduction into information and communication security
- Outline of this course

Business Informatics @ Goethe University Frankfurt

<p>E-Finance</p> <p>Prof. Dr. Peter Gomber</p>	<p>Business Informatics (Informatics)</p> <p>Prof. Dr. Mirjam Minor</p>	<p>Information Systems Engineering</p> <p>Prof. Dr. Roland Holten</p>
<p>Business Education (associated)</p> <p>Prof. Dr. Gerhard Minnameier</p>	<p>Mobile Business & Multilateral Security</p> <p>Prof. Dr. Kai Rannenber</p>	<p>Business Education (associated)</p> <p>Prof. Dr. Eveline Wuttke</p>
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Chair of Business Administration, especially Business Informatics, Mobile Business and Multilateral Security

Chair of Mobile Business & Multilateral Security

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 4
Campus Westend
RuW, 2nd Floor

Phone: +49 69 798 34701
Fax: +49 69 798 35004
e-mail: info@m-chair.de

www.m-chair.de



Team & PhD Students



Kai
Rannenberg



Narges
Arastouei



Diana
Weiss



Sascha
Löbner



Atiyeh
Sadeghi



Ann-Kristin
Lieberknecht



Frédéric
Tronnier



Ahad
Niknia



Peter
Hamm



Tim
Schiller



Michael
Schmid



Christopher
Schmitz

Selected Alumni



Prof. Dr. Jan Muntermann
Göttingen
University



Dr. Stefan Figge
BuyIn
(Deutsche Telekom / Orange)



Dr. Mike Radmacher
Deutsche Telekom



Dr. Andreas Albers
Deutsche Telekom



Dr. Stefan Weiss
Swiss Re



Prof. Dr. Denis Royer
Ostfalia -
Hochschule für angewandte
Wissenschaften



Dr. Markus Tschersich
Continental




Dr. Ahmad Sabouri
Continental



Dr. Falk Wagner
EE



Dr. Christian Kahl
CyberSolutions
GmbH



Dr. Gökhan Bal
Deutsche Bahn



Dr. André Deuker
KfW



Dr. Shuzhe Yang
GLS



Dr. Ahmed Yesuf
FARO



Dr. Welderufael Tesfay
Deutsche Telekom



Dr. Fatbardh Veseli
Capgemini
Germany



Dr. Majid Hatamian
Google



Dr. habil. Sebastian Pape
Continental



Dr. David Harborth
Capgemini
Invent

Office:

Diana Weiß

Office Hours: On appointment

RuW Building, Office 2.257

Email: diana.weiss@m-chair.de



Vita of Kai Rannenberg

Einbeck, Göttingen, Eystrup, Wolfsburg, ...
TU Berlin (Dipl.-Inform.)
Uni Freiburg (Dr. rer. pol.)



Dissertation “**Kriterien und Zertifizierung mehrseitiger IT-Sicherheit**“

Standardization at ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 and DIN NI-27

Kolleg “**Sicherheit in der Kommunikationstechnik**“
Gottlieb Daimler- and Karl Benz-Foundation

Multilateral Security:

“Empowering Users, Enabling Applications“, 1993 - 1999

Recent History of Kai Rannenberg

- 1999-09 till 2002-08
Microsoft Research Cambridge UK
www.research.microsoft.com
Responsible for “Personal Security Devices and Privacy Technologies“
- 2001-10 Call for this chair
- 2001-12 till 2002-07 Stand-in for the chair
- Since 2002-07 Professor at Goethe University Frankfurt at the Faculty of Business and Economics (FB02)
- Since 2012-04 Visiting Professor at the National Institute for Informatics (Tokyo, Japan)
- Since 2020-07 Professor, by courtesy, Goethe University Frankfurt at the Faculty of Computer Science and Mathematics (FB12)

- The Chair of M-Business and Multilateral Security
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	SS 2024	WS 2024/2025
Bachelor		<i>Course</i> Business Informatics 2 (PWIN)
Master	<i>Course</i> Mobile Business II: Application Design, Applications, Infrastructures and Security <i>Course</i> Information and Communication Security: Infrastructures, Technologies and Business Models <i>Course</i> Privacy vs. Data: Business Models in the digital, mobile Economy <i>Seminar</i> The Future is Now: Topics with and about ChatGPT and AI	<i>Course</i> Mobile Business I: Application Design, Applications, Infrastructures and Security <i>Course</i> Information and Communication Security: Infrastructures, Technologies and Business Models <i>Seminar</i> Machine Learning: Privacy, Regulations and Ethical Issues

Teaching Topics

Identity Management

Privacy

ICT Security

Mobile Business

Business Informatics

Master Courses

Lectures

Mobile Business 1

Privacy vs. Data

Seminars

Mobile Business 2

Master Thesis

I & C Security


Bachelor Courses

Lectures

Business Informatics 2


Seminars

Bachelor Thesis



Advancing *Mobile Business* while enabling individuals to be in control of their personal data by providing *Identity Management*, *Privacy Protection*, and *ICT Security* within the Digital Economy

Chair of
Mobile Business & Multilateral Security



- **Multilateral Security**
 - Security, Trust, Identity Management, and Privacy
 - Security and Privacy Management
 - Personal Security Devices
- **Mobile Life, Work, and Business**
 - Location-based Services
 - Mobile Communities
- **M-Infrastructures**
 - Combination, Integration, Innovation
 - Standardization, Regulation

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
Sascha Löbner, M.Sc.

RuW Building, Office 2.236


Email: sascha.loebner@m-chair.de



security@m-chair.de



Matt Bishop:
Introduction to
Computer Security
Addison Wesley
ISBN: 0-321-24744-2



Dieter Gollmann:
Computer Security
John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 0-470-74115-5



In German:

Claudia Eckert:

IT-Sicherheit

Oldenbourg

ISBN: 978-3-11-055158-7

Please Note:

Electronic library of journals, access to more than 2000 journals

<http://www.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/online/emedien.html>

Available only for university members via HRZ account (141.2.XXX.XXX IP-addresses; PC Pool) or via university library login:

www.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/login.html



search.epnet.com/login.asp
www.jstor.org



Internet search engines:

academic.live.com
scholar.google.com



On the dates and the agenda

- **Exam date and regulations not fixed yet.**

- Please keep yourself updated!
- Check the website of the examination office:

<https://www.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/en/study/services/examination-office/service-and-contact.html>

- **Course agenda is online.**

- Please keep yourself updated!
- Check the website of the course:

https://www.m-chair.de/index.php?option=com_teaching&view=lecture&id=67

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The New York Times

Facebook Security Breach Exposes Accounts of 50 Million Users

Sept. 28, 2018

February 15, 2012, 2:14PM

Anonymous-Linked Attacks Hit US Stock Exchanges

(Distributed) „Denial of Service“-Attacks on e-auctioneers/broker/betting office

bitkom



theguardian

News | Sport | Comment | Culture | Business | Money | Life & style

News > World news > Edward Snowden

Everyone is under surveillance now, says whistleblower Edward Snowden

People's privacy is violated without any suspicion of wrongdoing, former National Security Agency contractor claims

The New York Times

Security Gap Leaves 885 Million Mortgage Documents Exposed

May 24, 2019

BBC

Sign in

News

Sport

Reel

Worklife

Travel

Future

More

NEWS

Facebook's Twitter and Instagram accounts hacked

8 February 2020


Provider

- No payment - debtor cannot be captured
- Wrong or fake orders
- Copyright violations
- www attacks
- Internal server intrusion
- ...

Consumer


- Unwanted deliveries (false, not ordered, ...)
- Unauthorized / unexpected direct debt of money, e.g. from a credit card account
- Unwanted advertising mail (“spamming”)
- Transparent consumers
- ...

E-Commerce Requires Security



Source: Electronic Commerce Enquête, Universität Freiburg, 1998 [Schoder, Müller 1999]
(32 options + free text for choice, 6 options with highest agreement listed)

Security vs. Safety



A very human discrepancy

- **Privacy**
Protect the own sphere and the own values/assets
- **Binding**
Gain trust (of partners), transfer values

A technical arrangement

- **Confidentiality**
Information delivery just to whom it is intended
- **Integrity**
No faking of information
- **Availability**
No system failures / no loss of data
- **Accountability**
Actions always accountable to responsible parties

A combination of technical, organizational and legal methods is necessary. [Rannenbergh 2000a]

- *Unauthorized acquisition of information* = loss of **confidentiality**:
- Patient data (for example
 - information of physical examinations, diagnoses or therapy attempts, but also
 - content of meetings on patient cases which is stored in databases)
- shall not accessible to unauthorized persons (e.g.
 - other patients,
 - hospital employees, or
 - employees of the network operator whose (mobile) network is used to transfer the data from hospital to hospital).
- Citizens (in smart cities) should not be monitored or tracked by default.


- *Unauthorized modification* of information = loss of **integrity**:
- Unauthorized and unobserved data modifications (e.g. a prescription, a medicament ordering or a dosage instruction) may lead to life-threatening consequences.
- Forging of electronic records can create chaos in society - often discussed as informational warfare.
- Manipulation of traffic regulation and control in (smart) cities is a nuisance and can even be life-threatening.

- ***Unauthorized impair of functionality*** = loss of **availability**:
- If a patient's medical record is accessible solely via one network and this network fails, when patient data is needed, this may be life-threatening for the patient.
- (Smart) cities have a major problem, if critical infrastructures for e.g. electricity distribution are not available anymore.

- *No responsible parties for actions* = loss of **accountability**:
- If the persons liable for procedures in medical ICT systems (e.g. for the delivery of diagnoses, therapy instructions or billings) cannot be identified, irresponsible actions may occur.
- The consequences of a mistake may be worse for the injured party since it is unclear whom to ask for compensation.
- If (restrictive) measures (e.g. traffic suspension) taken in smart cities cannot be attributed to responsible parties (“the computer has decided”) citizens lose trust.


Different Parties with different Interests


- Customers/Merchants
- Communication partners
- Citizens/Administration



... in a world of
consortia

- more partners
- more complex relations





Respecting Interests

- Parties can define their own **interests**.
- Conflicts can be **recognized** and **negotiated**.
- Negotiated **results** can be **reliably enforced**.

Supporting Sovereignty

- Requiring each party to **only minimally trust** in the honesty of **others**
- Requiring **only minimal or no trust** in **technology** of others

Protection of **different parties** and their **interests**


Multilateral Security in daily communication

The Challenge


- Increased reachability due to new communication services
- Annoying calls
- Shortage of time
- Caller-ID conflict

→ Reachability Management (RM)

[Rannenbergs 2000b,c]



accept




or

deny




The Features

- Automatic call filtering under user control
- Privacy protection for both caller and callee
- Choice of different ways to express urgency
- Choice of different reactions for different situations



Negotiation



Topics of Negotiation


- Urgency of the call
- Extent of identification
- Security requirements
 - authentication
 - confidentiality
 - non-repudiation

RMS Call

Who Rannenberg, Katrin

◆ **My ID:** none

◆ **Subject:** Meeting?



Urgency:

Normal High Emergency

Security Settings: [View Details](#)

◆ **Confidentiality:** Important

◆ **Authentication:** Don't care

[Cancel](#) [Call](#)

Why should your call go through?

Statement of urgency

“It is really urgent!”

Specification of a function

“I am your boss!”

Specification of a subject

“Let’s have a party tonight.”

Presentation of a voucher

“I welcome you calling back.

Provision of a reference

“My friends are your friends!

Offering a surety

“Satisfaction guaranteed
or this money is yours!”

RMS Question

The subscriber wishes to be informed of your identity before the call could be connected.

Katrin Rannenberg's RMS requests for your identity:

Id: none
Damker [DS 97], Herbert
Damker, Herbert
Pseudonym Harry Hurtig (P)

Cancel Answer

RMS Question

At the moment the subscriber can only accept urgent calls. Please decide!


Katrin Rannenberg's RMS requires an answer to the request above:

My call is urgent, please connect.
 At the moment my call is not so urgent.

Cancel Answer

RMS accepted call (Callee display)

- Bell is ringing!
- Callee notified
- Callee can still decide to accept or deny the call



RMS denied call (Caller display)

- Call not connected
- Caller gets information (configured by callee)
- Caller can leave a message or request a call back

RMS: Call denied

Unfortunately the subscriber can not accept the call at the moment.

Leave with Katrin Rannenber:

Text message
 Request for callback (with voucher)
 No message

Situations

Set of rules how to deal with an incoming call

Rules

Combination of features

Users can reconfigure initial rules and situations as they like.

Define Situation 'Meeting'

Emergency
-> connect

Callback voucher
-> connect

Caller in group Colleagues
-> let caller decide
Text: 'Request decision'

Else
-> deny
Text: 'Not available'

Define Rule

In the situation 'Meeting'
my RMS should for ...

all calls calls of class:
 business calls private calls

... and ...

no caller ID
 caller want to be anonymous
 callback voucher
 caller in group:
 caller is:
 every caller
 Emergency

... do the following:

connect
 deny
 divert to:
 require surety of \$10 and connect
 require subject and connect
 let caller decide
 require caller ID

Text to send: -

Cancel OK

Respecting Interests

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Supporting Sovereignty

- Requiring each party to **only minimally trust** in the honesty of **others**
- Requiring **only minimal or no trust** in **technology** of others

Protection of **different parties** and their **interests**

- Protection of **callers and callees**
- **Balance** of security requirements
- Processing and storage of **sensitive data**
in a **personal environment**

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- [FGGKMMRS 2014] Felix Freiling, Rüdiger Grimm, Karl-Erwin Großpietsch, Hubert B. Keller, Jürgen Mottok, Isabel Münch, Kai Rannenberg & Francesca Saglietti: Technische Sicherheit und Informationssicherheit, Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten; Informatik-Spektrum, February 2014, Vol. 37, Issue 1, February 2014, pp. 14-24, DOI: 10.1007/s00287-013-0748-2; <https://fb-sicherheit.gi.de/fileadmin/FB/SICHERHEIT/AKBegriffsbildungIS-1-2014.pdf>
- [Rannenberg 2000a] Kai Rannenberg: Mehrseitige Sicherheit - Schutz für Unternehmen und ihre Partner im Internet; Wirtschaftsinformatik Volume 42, pp. 489-497 (2000), <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF03250765>
- [Rannenberg 2000b] Kai Rannenberg: Multilateral Security – A concept and examples for balanced security, pp. 151-162 in Proceedings of the 9th ACM New Security Paradigms Workshop 2000, September 19-21, 2000 Cork, Ireland; ACM Press; ISBN 1-58113-260-3, <https://m-chair.de/images/documents/publications/Rannenberg/p151-rannenberg.pdf>
- [Rannenberg 2000c] Kai Rannenberg: How much negotiation and detail can users handle?, pp. 37-54 in Frédéric Cuppens et al.: Computer security: Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security; October 4-6, 2000, Toulouse, France; Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1895, Springer-Verlag; ISBN 3-540-41031-7, <https://m-chair.de/images/documents/publications/Rannenberg/ESORICS-f-1.7.mh.pdf>
- [Schoder, Müller 1999] Detlef Schoder, Günter Müller: Potentiale und Hürden des Electronic Commerce – Eine Momentaufnahme, Informatik-Spektrum Volume 22, pp. 252–260 (1999), <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s002870050142>